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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: DISCLOSURE DENIED:
CONSUMERS UNION V. VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
In Consumers Union v. V~eterans Administration1 it was held that
under the Freedom of Information Act 2 a court may refuse to enjoin an
agency from non-disclosure of information even if the agency fails to
establish that the information sought falls within exemptions specifically
provided by Congress. Discretion in determining whether information
should be disclosed was inferred from a statutory grant of jurisdiction to
enjoin non-disclosure. Particularly in light of the statute's history, this
inference must be questioned.
The first portion of the Freedom of Information Act defines information which agencies are under an affirmative duty to make available
to the public:' information to be published in the Federal Register;
final opinions, orders, statements of policy and interpretations, staff
manuals and instructions affecting the public;5 identifiable records requested by any member of the public ;6 final votes of each agency
member in every agency proceeding. 7 The Act then retreats, setting
aside categories of information which agencies need not release to the
public such as trade secrets or investigatory files.8 Finally, the Act limits
1. Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) [hereinafter cited as Consumers Union].
2.80 Stat. 250 (1966), codified by 81 Stat. 54 (1967), 5 U.S.C. § 552. See
generally Note, Freedom of Informationz: The Statute and the Regulations, 56
GEo. LJ. 18 (1967); 80 HAIv. L. R .v. 909 (1966); Davis, The Informtion Act: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. Cni. L. R v. 761 (1966).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1967).
4. Id. § (a)(1).
5. Id. § (a) (2).
6. Id. § (a) (3):
. . . each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute,
and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to
any person. On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district
in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or
in which the agency records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency
from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court
shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its
action...
7. Id. § (a) (4).
8. Id.§ (b):
This section does not apply to matters that are(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
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withholding of information to those situations specifically authorized by
the Act.9
Consumers Union, a nonprofit organization which gathers information on consumer products and publishes it in CONSUMER REPORTS,
sought to procure reports on tests conducted by the Veterans Administration to determine which hearing aids would be purchased for veterans.
Three specific reports were requested. One contained the "raw scores"
made by the hearing aids on each test; another contained the formula
used in developing a scoring scheme for the hearing, aids; and the third
contained the ranking of the hearing aids based on "quality point
scores." 10 Following the agency's refusal to release the reports, Consumers Union filed suit, pursuant to the Act, to compel disclosure. It
was explictly held that the records did not come within any of the statutory
exemptions to disclosure." However, the court stated that it was "... not

bound under the Act to automatically order their disclosure .
12 for
the Freedom of Information Act conferred equity jurisdiction and thereby discretion when it empowered the court to enjoin the withholding of
information." The court indicated that it would order the production of
(2)

related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an

agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
9. Id. § (c) : "This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit
the availibility of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section." An
exception is made for Congressional investigations when no information may be withheld.
This tripartite structuring of the Act is in one sense conclusory. The emphasis
placed on the third division is, in part, a result of this note's conclusion that Congress
sought to drastically limit court and agency leeway in non-disclosure.
10. The quality point score is the scoring scheme applied to the raw scores.
11. 301 F. Supp. at 806.
12. Id.
13. 301 F. Supp. at 806. See also Benson v. General Services Administration,
289 F. Supp. 590, 593 (W.D. Wash. 1968) which in dicta set forth a similar position.
The court raised the question of whether a party must have reasonable grounds for
seeking information. Because a special need for the documents was shown, the court
did ".

.

. not consider whether he (plaintiff) must demonstrate some special need or
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records unless the agency was able to establish that disclosure would
result in ". . . significantly greater harm than good."' 4 The court
considered the evidence presented by the agency"5 and concluded that
the benefits of releasing the raw scores outweigh any
harm, but that the danger of the public being misled by releasing
the quality point scores and the disruption of the VA programs
that releasing the scoring scheme would cause outweighs any
benefits."6
S..

The court's equation of jurisdiction to enjoin with equity jurisdiction,
and a concomitant power to exercise discretion, must be questioned.
In 1946 the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure concluded that there was a need for legislative
*..recognition, first, of the various kinds or forms of information which ought to be available and, second, of the authority
and duty of agencies to issue such information."7
other reasonable grounds for inquiry in order to persuade the court to exercise the equity
jurisdiction granted the court by the statute." On appeal, the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals stated:
In exercising the equitable jurisdiction conferred by the Freedom of Information
Act, the court must weigh the-effects of disclosure and nondisclosure, according
to traditional equity principles, and determine the best course to follow in the
given circumstances. The effect on the public is the primary consideration.
25 Ad. L. 2d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 1969).
14. 301 F. Supp. at 806.
It is of note that the court in Consumers Union emphasizes that the burden is on
the agency to show harm in disclosure. The court specifically stated that there is a
presumption in favor of disclosure. But, as suggested by the analysis of this note
(infra at p. 430) the problem is not the willingness of the court to follow a Congressional desire for disclosure but rather the practical effect of exercising discretion.
15. The Veterans Administration had contended that release of the records would
...
mislead the public in their selection of hearing aids. . . [would disrupt
the agency's] procurement and research program, [and would injure] manufacturers who do not choose to participate in the program.
301 F. Supp. at 806-807. In the context of these contentions the court evaluated the
agency's evidence. In respect to the "raw scores" the court determined they would be
largely unintelligible to the untrained public. To minimize any misinterpretation by
professionals, explanatory materials could be released with the scores. Release of the
"raw scores" would not hinder the research and procurement programs of the agency, for
manufacturers knew when they submitted samples the scores could be released at the
discretion of the agency. Release of the other two records presented a greater possibility
of injury to the public. The "quality point scores", which ranked hearing aid models
against each other, presented an opportunity for the public to misinterpret the highest
ranked model as the best model without regard to their own needs. There was, furthermore, a fear that salesmen would misrepresent the scores as a recommendation. by the
Veterans Administration. In addition, fear that release of the scoring scheme would
stimulate production of "government-type" hearing aids while sacrificing the general
consumer market was balanced against the use of the scoring scheme by other laboratories in developing their own testing program.
16. Id. at 808.
17. The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
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Congress responded with section 3 of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act"s which provided that matters of official record should be
made ". . . available to persons properly and directly concerned except
information held confidential for good cause found. . . ."" In addition,
* . any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public

interest or any matter relating solely to the internal management of an
agency.. ." was excluded from the requirement of disclosure.20
Defects in this law soon became apparent. Congress had failed,
either in the statute itself or in the legislative history, to delimit such
vague phrases as "in the public interest," "persons properly and directly
concerned" and "for good cause found."' ' Further, the right to judicially
enforced disclosure under the Administrative Procedure Act was not
available unless the party seeking information could show that he, personally, was adversely affected or that he had suffered a legal wrong
and not the public in general as the result of agency action.22 The
difficulty in establishing this legal wrong in withholding information
seriously limited judicial review as a practical remedy.2' Even if review
were available the vague wording of the statute was so interpreted as to
leave the agency itself with discretion in the initial determination of what
information might or should be withheld. Accordingly, the likelihood
of judicial reversal of this determination was minimal.24
Limitations on who might seek disclosure in combination with
limitations on information subject to disclosure made the statute, in
Report, cited in

SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 15 (COMM. PRINT 1945).

SESS., REPORT ON

18. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.

19. Id.§ 3(c).
20. Id. § 3.
21. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
22. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10, 60 Stat. 243.
23. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1964). Both reports noted the lack of any effective remedy for
wrongful withholding of information.
24. The likelihood of reversal of agency action has been dealt with extensively in a
debate between Kenneth Culp Davis and Raoul Berger. See, Berger, Administrative
Arbitrarinessand Judicial Review, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 55; 4 K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A
Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966); Davis, Administrative
Arbitariness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administrative
Arbitariness-A Rejoinder to Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REV.
816 (1966); Davis, Admin'istrative Arbitrariness-A Postcript, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
823 (1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 MINN. L. REv. 601
(1967) ; Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness is Not Always Reviewable, 51 MINN. L.
REV. 643 (1967) ; Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J.
965 (1968).
Under the Freedom of Information Act the courts are required to determine de
novo whether the withholding of information has been proper. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3)

(1967).
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practice, more of an excuse for withholding information than a device
which encouraged disclosure.25 Prompted by such considerations Congress sought through the 1966 Freedom of Information Act
. . . to eliminate such [vague] phrases, to establish a general
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language and to
provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may
obtain information wrongfully withheld."
Under the new Act a particular individual's need for information is
no longer determinative of whether information is to be disclosed. The
broad test of "good cause" has been eliminated as a defense for agency
non-disclosure. Only if information fits within a specific exemption may
the agency refuse disclosure.2
It is not necessary to enter here into a debate over the willingness of
courts to reverse agency decisions.28 Whether prior reluctance to compel
disclosure was based on respect for agency decisions or on poor craftsmanship in drafting the statute, the practical result was the same-nondisclosure of agency information. Accordingly, it is not necessary to take
a position on the problems of judicial review of agency decisions in general
but only to remember that Congress sought disclosure and that discretion
in the agency, coupled with judicial restraint had thwarted that disclosure.2" The question is not the willingness of courts to review and
reverse agency decisions. The problem is Congressional intent and the
impact of discretion on the initial decision of the agency to disclose
information.
Re-introduction of discretion into the disclosure process would
defeat an attempt by Congress to provide clear standards in the area, even
if that discretion were lodged only in the courts. The discretionary
process by its very unpredictability will produce uncertainty as to the
validity of a particular claim. Accordingly, the willingness of potential
litigants to question an agency's non-disclosure of information will be
25. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1965). See also Moss, Public
Information Policies, The APA and Executive Prvilege,15 AD. L. REv. 111 (1965).
A trade publication sought a Navy telephone directory but the management of the
installation refused to release it. Citing the Administrative Procedure Act, the
management claimed the telephone directory related to internal management of the
Navy and, therefore, release was not required. The true reason for the refusal was
the management's dislike for the publication.
26. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
27. Id.; H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1964).
28. See note 24 supra.
29. See notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Graber Mfg. Co. v. Dixon,
223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963).
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affected. Further, the use of discretion by the courts may encourage
agencies to withhold information. If a court does not automatically
release information which is not specifically exempt from disclosure, then
the agency may see advantage in withholding and subsequently litigating
the merits of a particular claim.
Despite language to the contrary by the Consumers Union court,"0
a grant of jurisdiction to enjoin does not necessarily imply a grant of
discretion. Congress may and has required courts to grant injunctions on
the determination of specific facts solely in a ministerial capacity and
without the discretion of traditional equity jurisdiction. The non-discretionary injunction does exist.
Under traditional rules of equity the injunction is an extraordinary
remedy issued by courts to prevent irreparable harm. Issuance is dependent upon the facts of the case and is within the discretion of the
court. 1 The injunction also may be a legislative remedy. 2 It is at this
point that the question arises as to whether a statute which authorizes an
injunction also implies a grant of discretion. There have been two
interpretations given to statutory injunctions by the courts. On the one
hand it has been held that if statutory requirements are met an injunction
may be issued despite a failure to comply with traditional equity principles. e.g. without regard to the presence of an adequate remedy at law.
These cases, however, still apply the equity principle that there is no
absolute right to an injunction; the remedy is dependent upon the facts
and within the discretion of the court. 3 Under a second conception of
statutory injunctions courts have held that an injunction must be issued
if the statutory requirements are met. Under this interpretation an
absolute right to an injunction is created. To distinguish between those
situations in which discretion is appropriate and those in which the court
must issue an injunction, the Supreme Court has relied upon statutory
construction and legislative intent. 5 The question is into which category
30. 301 F. Supp. at 806.
31. See, e.g., Reliable Transfer Co. v. Blanchard, 145 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1944);
Asbury v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 264 F. Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1967); Clark v.
Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962) ; See also Note, Developments in the

Law-Injunctions,78 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1964).
32. See, e.g., Lenroot v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 146 F.2d 325 (8th Cir. 1945)
Wirtz v. Harper Buffing Machine, 280 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn. 1968).
33. S.E.C. v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937); Davis v. Hutting Sash & Door
Co., 288 F. Supp. 82 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
34. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). Cf. G. H. Miller &
Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. deied, 359 U.S. 907 (1958);
F.T.C. v. C.E. Niehoff & Co, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
35. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959); Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-29, 331 (1944).

JUDICIAL DISCRETION
the Freedom of Information Act3" fits.
In United Steelworkers v. United States 7 the Supreme Court faced
the question of whether the issuance of an injunction pursuant to the
Labor-Management Relations Act 8 was required under the statute. An
injunction had been obtained against an industry-wide steelworkers
strike. The union claimed that the court had failed to consider its
authority to use discretion prior to issuing the injunction or in the
alternative, if the court had used discretion, there was an abuse for the
broad injunction was not justified. 9 The Court rejected these contentions :
We do not believe that Congress in passing the statute
intended that the issuance of injunctions should depend upon
judicial inquiries of this nature. Congress was not concerned
with the merits of the parties' positions or the conduct or their
negotiations . . . . This Congressional determination of the
0
policy factors is of course binding on the courts."
The Labor-Management Relations Act directs the district court
• . . to enjoin such strike ... and if the court finds that such
threatened or actual strike . . . affects an entire industry or
a substantial part thereof. . . and if permitted to occur or to
continue, will imperil the national health or safety, it shall have
jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike .. and to make such other
orders as may be appropriate."1
The statutory language alone does not clearly eliminate the use of
discretion in the issuance of the injunction. "Jurisdiction to enjoin"
and authorization "to make such other orders as may be appropriate"
could imply court discretion. The language, however, when considered
with the Act's objectives imparts a contrary meaning. As the Court
noted, the statute was designed to provide a public remedy in times of
emergency.42 Congress did not intend to give a court the task of devising
a specific remedy under which some aspects of a strike would be permitted to continue. The complexities involved in devising such a remedy
would have interfered with the objective of insuring an immediate halt
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
361 U.S. 39 (1959) [hereinafter cited as United Steelworkers].
29 U.S.C. § 178 (1949).
361 U.S. at 46 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 178 (1949).
361 U.S. at 43.
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to a strike which affected the national welfare.48
In United Steelworkers an injunction was held to be required;
equitable discretion was found to be absent. An injunction, however, may
be required even if equity jurisdiction is present. The Fair Labor Standards Act4 4 has been interpreted to give the trial court equity jurisdiction
including the discretion implied within such a grant." However, this
grant is not unqualified. The court's discretion is limited by the purposes
of the Act. 6 In Schultz v. Parke" and Wirtz v. Wershaw Co.48 the
Secretary of Labor sought injunctions to restrain future violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Although both defendants complied with the
Act after they became aware of their obligation, these equities were
not found to be sufficient to warrant denial of the injunction. 9 As in
0 it was suggested that a public right had been
United Steelworkers,"
violated and not, exclusively, a private right."' Although it was implied,
the court in neither appeal went so far as to say that an injunction was
mandatory on the lower court once jurisdiction and violation were found.
The concurring opinion in Shultz stated that this was clearly the next
step.

2

Beyond holding that the purposes of an Act limit the use of equity
jurisdiction lies the concept that a public and not a private right is
offended. Therefore, a broader public concern as reflected in the purpose
of the statute may well compel the court to issue an injunction despite
one's antipathy to government by injunction and despite some countervailing equity in the hands of the individual defendent."8
43. Id. Of course, as support for a result contrary to Consumers Union, United
Steelworkers suffers from some infirmity due to the extreme public interest involved.
Less dramatic support may be found in Davis v. Hutting Sash and Door Co., 288
F.Supp. 82 (D. Okla. 1968) :
It appears to be settled that where Congress has set the standard for the
issuance of an injunction . . . these standards and no others need be satisfied
to obtain the injunctive relief. (citations omitted).
Id. at 85.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1938).
45. Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965).
46. Wirtz v. Saxon Co., 365 F.2d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1966).
47. Shultz v. Parke, 25 Ad. L. 2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1969).
48. Wirtz v. Wershow Co., 25 Ad. L. 2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969).
49. Id. at 1041-42.
50. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
51. 25 Ad. L. 2d at 1026 and 25 Ad. L. 2d at 1043 (citing Wirtz v. Jones, 340
F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1965)).
52. 25 Ad. L. 2d at 1029.
53. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)
(restitution of
rents collected by a landlord in excess of the permissible maximums) :
Unless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of
the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of
that jurisdiction. And since the public interest is involved in proceedings

429
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The use of the courts in what amounts to a ministerial capacity for
the enforcement of Congressional policy is hardly novel. Court enforcement of agency subpoenas provides an example. In ICC v. Brimson#
the Interstate Commerce Commission subpoenaed officials associated with
a number of railroads and with the Illinois Steel Company as well as
records of the companies. The officials refused either to answer the
questions or to produce subpoenaed records. The Interstate Commerce
Commission in accordance with section 12 of the Interstate Commerce
Act 5 petitioned the circuit court to compel "....

attendance and testimony

of witnesses, and the production of documents, books, and papers.""
The court held section 12 of the Act unconstitutional in its imposition
of nonjudicial duties on the court." The Supreme Court reversed holding
that the requirement of a "case or controversy" was met when the
officials refused to testify and to produce the subpoenaed records.58
The officials were in effect, denying they had a legal duty. If the testimony and records related to the matter under investigation, if the
Commission was legally entitled to investigate, and if there was no
privilege which would exclude the evidence,59 the court-as an enforcement
agency-was forced to compel compliance with the Commission's subpoena.6"
In contrast to a case such as United Steelworkers" the Court in
Hecht Co. v. Bowles62 held that the issuance of an injunction was within
the discretion of the court. In Hecht the administrator of the Emergency
of this nature, those equitable powers assume an even broader and more
flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake.
See also Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40 Railway Employees Department
of American Federation of Labor, 300 U.. 515, 552 (1937) (recognition of union by
company).
54. 154 U.S.447 (1894).
55. Act of Feb. 4,1887, ch. 104, § 12, 24 Stat. 379.
56. 154 U.S.at 457.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 477.
59. Id. at 476.
60. Id. at 477. See also Yakus v.U.S., 321 U.S. 414 (1944) involving a statutory
prosecution for violation of a price regulation. The Petitioners had failed to challenge
the validity of a price regulation in accordance with the Emergency Price Control Act.
The Act gave the Emergency Court of Appeals (and the Supreme Court on certiorari)
". .. 'exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any regulation or order';
coupled with the provision that 'no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have
jurisdiction or power to consider the validity of any such regulation'. . .

."

Id. at

429-30. The Court held that the statute precluded a district court from considering the
validity of the regulation as a defense to a criminal prosecution for its violation. Thus,
the power of the district court was limited to enforcing the criminal penalities.
See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965) ; Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,
317 U.S. 501 (1943).
61. 361 U.S.39.
62. 321 U.S. 321 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Hecht].
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Price Control Act"8 claimed that the Hecht department store had charged
excess prices and had failed to keep proper records as required by law.
An injunction was sought to restrain the company from further violations.
The court found Hecht's violations to have been good faith mistakes due
in part to human failings, inability to interpret complex regulations, and
size of business.64 When violations were found, they were corrected and
the company sought to make refunds where possible.
The Emergency Price Control Act provided that the Administrator
could apply for
...an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order
enforcing compliance with such provisions, and upon a showing
by the Administrator that such person has engaged or is about
to engage in any such acts . . . a permanent or temporary in-

junction, restraining order, or other order shall be granted ......
The Court noted that the statute appealed to the court's equity jurisdiction,
for it left the court free to determine the appropriate remedy. Again,
despite the Court's language, the statute's language alone is not decisive.
Certainly, the language could imply that a court's discretion is limited
to choosing between a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining
order, or other order and that its discretion did not extend to non-issuance of any order. The Court, however, interpreted the statute so as to
allow full discretion in order to fulfill the objectives of the Act.
Neither statutory construction nor legislative purpose would authorize the Consumers Union66 court to read discretion into the Freedom
of Information Act. The pertinent portions of the Freedom of Information Act read:
• . . [e]ach agency, on request for identifiable records . . .
shall make the records promptly available to any person ....
[T]he district court . .. has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency

from withholding agency records ...

"

This section does not authorize withholding of information
or limit the availability of records to the public, except as
63. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 205, 56 Stat. 33, as amended Jan. 30, 1944, ch.
328, § 108, 58 Stat. 640.
64. In the year of the violations Hecht had transacted twenty million dollars in
business, employed two thousand clerks, and sold over one million items. In addition,
Hecht had maintained a price control office to administer the Act.
65. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 205, 56 Stat. 33, as amended, Jan. 30, 1944, ch.

328, § 108, 58 Stat. 640.
66. 301 F. Supp. 796.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1967).
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specifically stated in this section. 8
The very structure of the Act suggests there is no discretion: Information
is to be withheld only if it falls within a statutory exemption. 9 Consumers
Union, however, has so interpreted the statute as to confer discretion on
the court by relying on the phrase "jurisdiction to enjoin.""0 By implication the statute's elimination of discretion was directed solely at the
agency, and not the court.
In passing the Freedom of Information Act,' Congress sought to
insure the availability of information while weighing the necessary
interests of confidentiality." Congress itself has balanced the factors
entering into the desirability of disclosing various categories of information and has written its findings into the Act. The situation in United
Steelworkers" is comparable. While "prosecutorial" discretion was vested in the President,' 4 Congress established certain criteria which, if met,
and if suit were brought, would control the courts in deciding whether or
not to issue an injunction. 5 The lesson of United Steelworkers for the
Freedom of Information Act is clear. In both cases Congress established
the criteria for relief. In a sense, Congress performed the act of discretion.
Accordingly, discretion was not lodged in the courts.
In United Steelworkers and the Fair Labor Standards cases' the
courts pointed out that the issue in question was a public harm, a public
right."' The elimination of a narrow private interest" in the Freedom of
Information Act implies an interest in the public which corresponds to
that in the labor cases. The similarity of interest in these two contexts
suggests that an injunction is required of the courts under the Freedom of
Information Act.
It should be noted that the public interest which Congress sought to
protect was disclosure." The language of Consumers Union suggests
a subtle perversion of this goal:
Because the Act was intended to benefit the public generally,
[the court stated] it is primarily effects on the public rather
68. Id. § (c) (emphasis added).
69. I&
70. 301 F. Supp. 806.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965).
361 U.S. 39.
29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1949).
See notes 40-43 .mpraand accompanying text.
See notes 46-48 supra.
See notes 42-43, 50-52 supraand accompanying text
See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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than on the person seeking the records that must be weighed.8"
Under this language the Act still protects the public-but not necessarily
by disclosure. So read, the Act is a general warrant for protection of the
public and not a simple recognition that an individual may seek disclosure
under claim of public right. 8'
The public-private distinction, of course, can be carried only so far.
In Hecht,82 the Court could have concluded that the public interest in
protecting wage-price controls was critical, and overriding of individual
equity. Yet, the use of public interest in United Steelworkers" suggests
at least the importance of the factor as a consideration in determining
whether an injunction is required.
Even if Congressional preemption of discretion or public interest do
not demand a certain result, but are only factors, it would still be
inappropriate to read judicial discretion into the Freedom of Information
Act. Professor Davis has come to the contrary conclusion-judicial
discretion is appropriate. In an article8" relied on by the Consumers
Union court,85 Davis notes that the statute is, at best, poorly worded. For
example, what is "internal . . . practices" ;8 what is "confidential" and
"commercial" information?" To remedy this situation, Davis concludes
that judicial discretion is necessary to insure the effective operation of
the Act.88
Is the broad grant of discretion proposed by Davis necessary? Why
shouldn't the courts take on the task of working with the statute, of
defining those situations in which information will, or will not, be
disclosed. Errors may be made which will require Congressional correction, but is this any less the case where broad discretion is exercised
in error?
The advantage of this solution over that of Professor Davis is clear.
After a period of definition the limits of the statutory mandate will become
sharpened, and will work as clear guides to the agencies. In contrast,
Davis' interjection of discretion would result in perennial uncertainty as
to the result of a particular case.89
80. 301 F. Supp. at 806.
81. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.

82. 321 U.S. 321.
83. 361 U.S. 39.
84. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV.

761 (1966).
85. 301 F. Supp. at 800 n.9.
86. Davis, supra note 84 at 785-86.

87. Id. at 787-92.
88. Id. at 803-804.
89. This response to Davis was written on the assumption that discretion was

JUDICIAL DISCRETION
A second and perhaps more serious, objection to the Freedom of
Information Act has also been raised by Professor Davis. He notes that
the Act may be so poorly written that it is impossible to correct through
judicial explication." For example, "financial . . . privileged" informa-

tion is exempt from disclosure.91 No mention is made of nonfinancial
privileged information. Davis contends that this material should be
exempt even beyond possible constitutional requirements. The only way
to correct such failings is to inject a liberal dose of discretion. Such an
argument would support the logic of Consumers Union" (if not the
result) and override considerations which run against a grant of judicial
discretion. Before the argument's validity is accepted, however, the premises on which it is based should be made explicit. First, Davis' argument
would reject the notion that Congress made a considered judgment when
the bill was passed. Is it not possible that non-financial information, if
not covered by any other exemption (e.g. medical files, 3 investigatory
files"4), was not intended to be exempt? Second, Davis' solution would
deny Congress can correct its own errors (if there are errors). Professor
Davis' conclusion may well be unavoidable, but before adoption its underlying assumptions should at least be considered.
Further, there is a positive dis-value in the Davis suggestion. The
insertion of discretion will restrict the availability of information. An
agency may see in the court's assertion of equity jurisdiction a broad and
obscure ground for withholding information. Whatever the agency's
reason for resisting disclosure, discretion offers the agency an alternative
to releasing nonexempt information. It may withhold information and
force the party seeking disclosure to file suit. Although the agency has
meant to imply a broad, undefined power to determine in which situations information

should be disclosed. However, to the extent that Professor Davis meant by the term
nothing more than an initial period in which the power is used to sharpen the focus of
the statute, followed by a period in which the cases employing discretion would become
precedent limiting the act, there would be little difference between his suggestion and

that of this note.
90. Davis, supra note 84, at 811. In the article Davis states:
• . . [R]equired disclosure of non-commercial and non-financial information
which is privileged or confidential is clearly undesirable. The solution, in
my opinion, should be in spite of the statute or outside the statute. Id. at 791.
* . * [T]he abolition [of the law of privilege] is so capricious that the law
of privilege will survive its abolition, either because constitutional law of
executive privilege will override the statue or because equity tradition will
impel courts to refuse enforcement. Id. at 802. . . . [T]he Act is so unworkable that it must be in large measure superceded by official and judicial
understanding based on considerations beyond the Act.... Id. at 803.
91. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1967).
92. 301 F. Supp. 796.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1967).
94. Id. (b) (7).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

the burden of proving its action proper, 5 it may draw upon the particular
merits of the claim. Thus, the agency, the court and the party seeking
information will be involved in questioning whether disclosure is in the
"public interest," whether the party seeking the information is "properly
and directly concerned," and whether there is "good cause" for holding
the information confidential.9" These are the same vague concepts that
Congress sought to eliminate from the Freedom of Information Act."
CONCLUSION

A court must distinguish a generally worded appeal to equity
jurisdiction from a legislatively prescribed remedy. The Consumers
Union" court failed to do so. As the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in United Steelworkers states:
"Discretionary" jurisdiction is exercised when a given injunctive remedy is not commanded as a matter of policy by Congress, but is, as a presupposition of judge-made law, left to
judicial discretion.9
If disclosure of agency information is to be assured, considerations of
practical effect and Congressional intent require observance of this
distinction.
Judith A. Mitnick
95. Id. (a) (3).
96. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.
97. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); H.R. RE,. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1964).
98. 301 F. Supp. 796.
99.

361 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

